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Abstract
It is well known that a competitive equilibrium may fail to exist when consumers' preferences
are possibly satiated. In this paper, we provide three new sufficient conditions for the
existence of a competitive equilibrium in the standard Arrow-Debreu pure exchange
economy with satiated consumers. We first consider a condition that restricts the behavior of
the excess demand correspondence on the boundary of a certain subset of the price domain.
Another two sufficient conditions are obtained by using the existence result under this
condition.
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It is well known that a competitive equilibrium may fail to exist when consumers’
preferences are satiated. More precisely, if consumers’ preferences are satiated in the
individually feasible consumption sets, then, at every price, consumers may choose their
optimal consumption bundles in the interior of their budget sets. This leads to a violation
of the Walras Law, and hence, to the nonexistence of a competitive equilibrium. 1
Satiation occurs, for example, when preferences form a complete continuous preorder
and consumption sets are compact. Mas-Colell (1992) provides several examples of
economies in which consumption sets are naturally compact. Another example of sa-
tiation occurs in the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) without a riskless asset (see,
for example, Nielsen 1989).
Given satiation in individually feasible consumption sets, many authors investigate
the conditions that ensure the existence of a competitive equilibrium. The suﬃcient
conditions proposed in the literature may be classiﬁed according to whether they allow
consumers to have their satiation points only within the individually feasible consumption
sets (Polemarchakis and Siconolﬁ 1993, Won and Yannelis 2006, etc.), or not (Werner
1987, Sun 1999, Allouch and Le Van 2008, etc.).
Polemarchakis and Siconolﬁ (1993) consider a certain subset of the price domain in
which the aggregate excess demand satisﬁes the Walras Law, and propose a condition
that restricts the behavior of the aggregate excess demand at the prices that lie on the
boundary of the subset. Won and Yannelis (2006) study the existence of an equilibrium
with satiation in a more general setting: for example, in their model, consumption sets
are not necessarily bounded and preferences are allowed to be non-ordered. They propose
a condition that may be interpreted as a restriction of consumers’ behavior on a certain
subset of the price domain (which generally diﬀers from the subset used in Polemarchakis
and Siconolﬁ 1993). Some other suﬃcient conditions which can be applied to the case
in which satiation occurs only within the individually feasible consumption sets, can be
found in the literature on the CAPM without a riskless asset, such as Nielsen (1990),
Allingham (1991) and Won et al. (2008).
In asset markets with short selling, Werner (1987) introduces a condition that requires
each consumer to have a consumption bundle that increases his or her satisfaction when
it is added to any given consumption bundle. Sun (1999) provides a similar condition in
the standard Arrow-Debreu production economy. It asserts that each consumer has at
least one good, consumption of which does not decrease his or her utility. Allouch and
Le Van’s (2008) condition, which is a generalization of the conditions in Werner (1987)
and Sun (1999), asserts that each consumer’s satiation area has an intersection outside
the individually feasible consumption set. Although these conditions cannot be applied
to the case in which there exists a consumer whose satiation area is a subset of the
individually feasible consumption set, they are imposed on the primitives of the model
and have natural economic interpretations.
In this paper, we provide three new suﬃcient conditions for the existence of a compet-
itive equilibrium in a pure exchange economy with satiated consumers. We ﬁrst consider,
as in Polemarchakis and Siconolﬁ (1993), restricting the behavior of the aggregate de-
mand on the boundary of a certain subset of the price domain. Polemarchakis and
Siconolﬁ (1993) assume the strict quasi-concavity of utility functions, which implies that
1It is also known that the existence of a competitive equilibrium is ensured if satiation occurs only
outside the individually feasible consumption sets (see Bergstrom 1976).
1each consumer has a unique satiation point. However, in our analysis, we assume weak
convexity of preferences, and consumers may thus have multiple satiation points. As a
result, we obtain a condition that contains Polemarchakis and Siconolﬁ’s (1993) condition
as a special case (Condition 1). It is worth noting that this condition can be applied to
the case in which satiation occurs only within the individually feasible consumption sets.
Moreover, by using the existence result under Condition 1, we obtain another two suﬃ-
cient conditions for the existence of a competitive equilibrium. In contrast to Condition
1, both of these conditions are imposed on the primitives of the model.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and sets out our
assumptions. Section 3 introduces some additional notations. Section 4 presents the
new condition (Condition 1), and states the existence of a competitive equilibrium under
it. Section 5 presents the other two conditions. In Section 6, we prove that Condition
1 contains Polemarchakis and Siconolﬁ’s (1993) condition as a special case. Section 7
contains our concluding remarks. Some of the proofs are given in the Appendix.
2 Model and Assumptions
We consider a pure exchange economy E with ℓ commodities and n consumers (1 ≤
ℓ,n < ∞). For convenience, let I be the set of all consumers, that is, I = {1,··· ,n}. Each
consumer i ∈ I is characterized by a consumption set Xi ⊂ Rℓ, 2 an initial endowment
ωi ∈ Rℓ, and a preference relation %i on Xi. Let X =
∏
i∈I Xi and let x = (xi)i∈I denote
a generic element of X.











i∈I ωi. Note that we do not allow
free disposal. For each i ∈ I, a consumption bundle xi ∈ Xi is individually feasible if
there exists (xj)j̸=i ∈
∏




j∈I ωj. Let ˆ Xi be the set of all
individually feasible consumption bundles of consumer i.
We adopt the following standard deﬁnition of competitive equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 1. An element (x,p) ∈ X × Rℓ is a competitive equilibrium of E if






In the deﬁnition, ≻i denotes the strict preference relation corresponding to %i, that is,
for any xi,yi ∈ Xi, we have yi ≻i xi if and only if yi %i xi and not xi %i yi. Note that
from Deﬁnitions 1 (a) and 1 (c), we have p · xi = p · ωi for each i ∈ I.
We make the following assumptions on the economy E.
Assumption 1. For each i ∈ I,
(a) Xi is convex, (b) Xi is compact, (c) ωi ∈ intXi.
2We shall use the following mathematical notations. The symbol Rℓ denotes the ℓ-dimensional
Euclidean space, and Rℓ
+ denotes the non-negative orthant of Rℓ. For x,y ∈ Rℓ, we denote by
x · y =
∑ℓ
j=1 xjyj the inner product, by ∥x∥ =
√
x · x the Euclidean norm. Let B(x0,r) = {x ∈
Rℓ : ∥x − x0∥ < r} denote the open ball centered at x0 with radius r. For a ∈ R = R1, we denote by |a|
the absolute value of a. For a,b ∈ R with a ≤ b, we denote by (a,b) the open interval, and by [a,b] the
closed interval between a and b. For a set A ⊂ Rℓ, we denote by intA the interior of A in Rℓ, by bdA
the boundary of A in Rℓ and by coA the convex hull of A.
2Assumption 2. For each i ∈ I,
(a) %i is a complete preorder on Xi,
(b) %i is continuous, (c) %i is weakly convex.3
These assumptions are fairly standard in the literature, except for Assumption 1 (b),
which together with 2 (a) and 2 (b), guarantees that every consumer has at least one
satiation point on his or her consumption set.
3 Additional Notations
In order to state our main result, we introduce some additional notations.
For each p ∈ Rℓ, we deﬁne the budget set of consumer i ∈ I by Bi(p) = {xi ∈ Xi :
p · xi ≤ p · ωi}. For each i ∈ I, let Di : Rℓ → Xi be the demand correspondence of
consumer i ∈ I, that is, for each p ∈ Rℓ,
Di(p) = {xi ∈ Xi : xi ∈ Bi(p) and xi %i yi for all yi ∈ Bi(p)}.








Note that p ∈ Rℓ is a competitive equilibrium price if and only if 0 ∈ Z(p).
Let Si be the set of all satiation points of consumer i ∈ I, that is,
Si = {xi ∈ Xi : xi %i yi for all yi ∈ Xi}.
For each i ∈ I and si ∈ Si, let
Qi(si) = {p ∈ R
ℓ : p · si ≥ p · ωi}.
Since Si ̸= ∅ for all i ∈ I under Assumptions 1 and 2, the set Qi(si) is well deﬁned. Note
that Qi(si) is a closed convex cone with vertex 0 for all i ∈ I and si ∈ Si.







It is clear that Q(s) is a closed convex cone with vertex 0 for all s ∈ S.
At the price p ∈ Q(s), the value of si is greater than or equal to that of ωi for every
consumer i ∈ I. Note that if p / ∈ Q(s) for all s ∈ S, this p is not an equilibrium price.
Indeed, if p / ∈ Q(s) for all s ∈ S, then there exists i ∈ I such that p · si < p · ωi for all
si ∈ Si, and thus, at the price p, consumer i’s optimal consumption bundles must be in
the interior of his or her budget set (recall that at an equilibrium price, each consumer’s
budget constraint must be held with equality). Therefore, if there exists an equilibrium
price, it must be in the set ∪s∈SQ(s).
Let Q0(s) denote the polar of Q(s), that is,
Q
0(s) = {q ∈ R
ℓ : q · p ≤ 0 for all p ∈ Q(s)}.
3A preference relation %i is weakly convex if yi %i xi implies that tyi+(1−t)xi %i xi for all t ∈ (0,1).
3The set Q0(s) is also a closed convex cone with vertex 0 for all s ∈ S.
4 Main Result
We now propose the following suﬃcient condition for the existence of a competitive
equilibrium.
Condition 1. There exists s ∈ S satisfying
(a) intQ(s) ̸= ∅,
(b) for all p ∈ bdQ(s) \ {0}, if there exists z ∈ Z(p) ∩ Q0(s) such that p · z = 0, then
0 ∈ Z(p).
Condition 1 (a) asserts that the set Q(s) is suﬃciently large. Condition 1 (b) restricts
the behavior of aggregate demand on the boundary of Q(s).
It is worth noting that this condition allows Si to be contained in the individually
feasible set, unlike the conditions proposed by Werner (1987), Sun (1999), and Allouch
and Le Van (2008). Moreover, Condition 1 is an extension of the condition introduced
in Polemarchakis and Siconolﬁ (1993), where each consumer’s preference is assumed to
be strictly convex, 4 and thus, Si is a singleton for all i ∈ I. In section 6, we prove that
Condition 1 is equivalent to Polemarchakis and Siconolﬁ’s (1993) condition under the
strict convexity of consumers’ preferences.
The ﬁrst and main result of this paper is the following proposition, the proof of which
is given in the Appendix.
Proposition 1. Under Assumptions 1 and 2 and Condition 1, there exists a competitive
equilibrium.
5 Another two suﬃcient conditions
By using the main result, we can obtain another two suﬃcient conditions for the
existence of a competitive equilibrium. Unlike Condition 1, these conditions are imposed
on the primitives of the model. The proofs of the propositions stated in this section are
provided in the Appendix.
We ﬁrst provide a condition that implies Condition 1 under our assumptions.
For arbitrarily chosen s ∈ S, consider n vectors s1 − ω1,··· ,sn − ωn. Each vector
si−ωi indicates the direction from consumer i’s initial endowment to his or her satiation
point si. Condition 1 (a) may be violated for this s when the vectors s1−ω1,··· ,sn−ωn
point in widely diﬀerent directions. Indeed, s violates Condition 1 (a) if for some i,j ∈ I,
two vectors si − ωi and sj − ωj point in the opposite directions. Conversely, however,
if all the vectors s1 − ω1,··· ,sn − ωn point in the same direction, s satisﬁes not only
Condition 1 (a) but also 1 (b).
More precisely, the following condition implies Condition 1 under our assumptions,
and is therefore another suﬃcient condition for the existence of a competitive equilibrium.
Condition 2. There exist s ∈ S and v ∈ Rℓ with ∥v∥ = 1 such that
si = ωi + αiv for all i ∈ I,
where αi = ∥si − ωi∥ ≥ 0 for each i ∈ I.
4A preference relation %i is strictly convex if yi %i xi implies that tyi+(1−t)xi ≻i xi for all t ∈ (0,1).
4Condition 2 asserts that every consumer i ∈ I has at least one satiation point in
the direction v, which is common to all the consumers, from his or her initial endow-
ment. This condition is imposed on the primitives of the model and provides an intuitive
interpretation of Condition 1.
Proposition 2. Under Assumptions 1 (a) and 2 (c), Condition 2 implies Condition 1.
We next provide a condition that generalizes Bergstrom’s (1976) nonsatiation condi-
tion. The existence of a competitive equilibrium under the condition is shown by using
Proposition 1.
For each i ∈ I, let intXi ˆ Xi denote the interior of ˆ Xi in the relative topology of Xi,
that is, xi ∈ intXi ˆ Xi if and only if there exists an open ball B(xi,r) centered at xi with







j̸=i Xj. Then, it is easy to check that xi ∈ intXi ˆ Xi if xj ∈ intXj for some
j ̸= i. Note also that since Xi is connected and intXi ˆ Xi ̸= ∅ for all i ∈ I under our
assumptions, if Xi ̸= ˆ Xi, the set intXi ˆ Xi, which is open in Xi, does not coincide with ˆ Xi,
which is closed in Xi.
Consider the following condition.
Condition 3. Si ∩ intXi ˆ Xi = ∅ for all i ∈ I.
Condition 3 asserts that each consumer’s preference is nonsatiated within the interior
(in the above sense) of the individually feasible consumption set. This condition gener-
alizes Bergstrom’s (1976) nonsatiation condition, which requires that Si ∩ ˆ Xi = ∅ for
all i ∈ I, because our condition allows consumer i’s satiation points to be individually
feasible as long as they lie on the boundary of ˆ Xi in Xi (i.e., ˆ Xi \ intXi ˆ Xi).
Allouch and Le Van’s (2008) nonsatiation condition, which requires that Si ∩ (Xi \
ˆ Xi) ̸= ∅ for all i ∈ I, also generalizes Bergstrom’s condition. While their condition allows
Si to intersect with intXi ˆ Xi, Condition 3 does not. However, Condition 3 allows Si to be
fully contained in the boundary of ˆ Xi in Xi, while their condition does not.
We now state the existence of a competitive equilibrium under Condition 3. 5
Proposition 3. Under Assumptions 1 and 2 and Condition 3, there exists a competitive
equilibrium.
6 Relation to Polemarchakis and Siconolﬁ’s Result
Polemarchakis and Siconolﬁ (1993) investigate economies with satiated consumers and
propose a suﬃcient condition similar to Condition 1. However, their condition cannot be
applied to the case in which consumers have multiple satiation points, because in their
analysis, they assume the strict quasi-concavity of each consumer’s utility function, which
corresponds to the strict convexity of %i. In contrast, in Proposition 1 of this paper, we
only assume the weak convexity of preferences, which allows consumers’ demand functions
to be multivalued. Moreover, Condition 1 contains Polemarchakis and Siconolﬁ’s (1993)
5Condition 3 does not imply Condition 1 under our assumptions. Consider the following economy
with ℓ = n = 2. Let X1 = X2 = R2
+ and ω1 = ω2 = (1,1). Consumers’ preferences are represented by
the utility functions u1(x1) = −(x11 − 2)2 − x2
12 and u2(x2) = −x2
21 − (x22 − 2)2. Then, s1 = (2,0) and
s2 = (0,2) are the unique satiation points of each consumer. It is easy to check that si / ∈ intXi ˆ Xi for
each i ∈ I. However, for s = (s1,s2) ∈ S, the set Q(s) is a one-dimensional linear subspace of R2, and
thus, intQ(s) = ∅.
5condition as a special case; in other words, Condition 1 and Polemarchakis and Siconolﬁ’s
(1993) condition are equivalent under the strict convexity of preferences. We prove this
fact in this section.
We ﬁrst replace Assumption 2 (c) with
2 (c’) %i is strictly convex.
Under Assumption 2 (c’), the excess demand correspondence Z : Rℓ → Rℓ is single-
valued and Si is a singleton for each i ∈ I. Let si denote consumer i’s unique satiation
point, and let s = (si)i∈I.
For each p ∈ Rℓ, deﬁne a subset N(p) of Rℓ by
N(p) = {
∑
i∈I λi(si − ωi) ∈ Rℓ : λi ≤ 0 and λip · (si − ωi) = 0 for all i ∈ I}.
Polemarchakis and Siconolﬁ (1993) propose the following suﬃcient condition for the
existence of a competitive equilibrium.
Condition PS.
(a) intQ(s) ̸= ∅,6
(b) for all p ∈ bdQ(s) \ {0}, if Z(p) ∈ N(p), then Z(p) = 0.
Theorem 1. Under Assumptions 1, 2 (a), 2 (b), and 2 (c’) and Condition PS, there
exists a competitive equilibrium.
We now prove the equivalence between Condition 1 and Condition PS under the strict
convexity of preferences. Note that under Assumption 2 (c’), Condition 1 (b) is restated
as
for all p ∈ bdQ(s)\{0}, if Z(p) ∈ Q0(s) and p·Z(p) = 0, then Z(p) = 0.
Proposition 4. Under Assumption 2 (c’), Condition 1 is equivalent to Condition PS.
Proof. We ﬁrst prove that Condition PS implies Condition 1. Let p ∈ bdQ(s)\{0} and
Z(p) ∈ Q0(s) with p · Z(p) = 0. We prove that Z(p) ∈ N(p); then, from Condition PS,
we have Z(p) = 0.





i∈I λi(si − ωi) ∈ Rℓ : λi ≤ 0 for all i ∈ I}. (1)





Since p ∈ Q(s) and p · Z(p) = 0, if λi < 0, then p · (si − ωi) = 0. Thus, we obtain
λip · (si − ωi) = 0 for all i ∈ I, which implies that Z(p) ∈ N(p).
The converse is immediate since N(p) ⊂ Q0(s) by equation (1) and p · y = 0 for all
y ∈ N(p).
6To be precise, Polemarchakis and Siconolﬁ (1993) impose not intQ(s) ̸= ∅ but Q(s) ̸= {0}. Although
Proposition 1 is still true even if we adapt Q(s) ̸= {0} instead of intQ(s) ̸= ∅, when intQ(s) = ∅,
imposing Conditions 1 (b) or PS (b) can be equivalent to imposing the existence of a competitive
equilibrium itself (consider the case when Q(s) is a one-dimensional linear subspace of Rℓ).
67 Concluding Remarks
Throughout the paper, we assume the compactness of each consumer’s consumption
set, which guarantees that every consumer’s preference has at least one satiation point.
If there exists a consumer whose consumption set is unbounded and whose preference
is never satiated, then Condition 1, as well as the condition proposed by Polemarchakis
and Siconolﬁ (1993), cannot be applied because we cannot deﬁne the set Qi(·) for such a
consumer. To handle this case, we need to extend the condition further.
Moreover, our analysis is limited to the pure exchange economy. Whether our results
can be extended to production economies is another question.
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7Appendix
In the proof of Proposition 1, we use the following theorem by Debreu (1955).
Theorem 2. Let C be a closed, convex cone with vertex 0 in Rℓ, which is not a linear
manifold; let C0 be its polar. If the correspondence ζ from C ∩ S(0,1)7 to Rℓ is upper
semicontinuous and bounded, and if for every p ∈ C ∩ S(0,1), the set ζ(p) is nonempty,
convex, and satisﬁes p·ζ(p) ≤ 0, then there is a p in C ∩S(0,1) such that ζ(p)∩C0 ̸= ∅.








i∈I ωi. This implies that si ̸= ωi for some i ∈ I, and thus, Q(s) ̸= Rℓ. In addition, Q(s)
is not a linear manifold of Rℓ by Condition 1 (a).
Let βi : S(0,1) → Xi be a correspondence deﬁned by
βi(p) = {xi ∈ Xi : p · xi = p · ωi}, p ∈ S(0,1).
For each i ∈ I, let φi : S(0,1) → Xi be a correspondence deﬁned by
φi(p) = {xi ∈ Xi : xi ∈ βi(p) and xi %i yi for all yi ∈ βi(p)}, p ∈ S(0,1).
Under Assumptions 1 and 2, for each i ∈ I, the correspondence φi is upper semicontinuous
and nonempty compact convex valued (see Montesano 2001, Propositions 1 and 2).







ωi, p ∈ Q(s) ∩ S(0,1).
By this deﬁnition, it is clear that ζ is upper semicontinuous, nonempty compact convex
valued on Q(s) ∩ S(0,1) and that p · ζ(p) = 0 for all p ∈ Q(s) ∩ S(0,1).
Applying Theorem 2 as C = Q(s), we obtain an element p ∈ Q(s)∩S(0,1) such that
ζ(p) ∩ Q0(s) ̸= ∅.
Let z ∈ ζ(p) ∩ Q0(s). We prove that z ∈ Z(p). From the deﬁnition of ζ, there exists
x ∈ X such that







For each i ∈ I, from the deﬁnition of φi, we have p · xi = p · ωi, and p · xi ̸= p · ωi for all
xi ≻i xi. Moreover, since p ∈ Q(s), we have p · si ≥ p · ωi. Together with Assumptions 2
(a) and 2 (c), this implies that either xi ∈ Si or p · xi > p · ωi for all xi ≻i xi. Thus, we




i∈I ωi ∈ Z(p).
We now prove that p ∈ Q(s) is an equilibrium price.
Since z ∈ Z(p) ∩ Q0(s) and p · z = 0, if p ∈ bdQ(s), we have 0 ∈ Z(p) by Condition
1 (b).
Suppose that p ∈ intQ(s). If z ̸= 0, there exists a ℓ-dimensional vector q ∈ Rℓ such
that q · z > 0 and q ∈ Q(s). Indeed, let q(t) = tz + (1 − t)p for t ∈ (0,1). Since p · z=0,
we have q(t)·z > 0 for all t ∈ (0,1). We also have q(t) ∈ Q(s) for t suﬃciently close to 0
since p ∈ intQ(s). Thus, for t suﬃciently close to 0, we have q(t)·z > 0 and q(t) ∈ Q(s).
However, this contradicts the fact that z ∈ Q0(s). Thus, z = 0 ∈ Z(p).
7The symbol S(0,1) denotes the (ℓ−1) dimensional unit sphere, that is, S(0,1) = {q ∈ Rℓ : ∥q∥ = 1}.
8Proof of Proposition 2. Let s ∈ S and v ∈ Rℓ with ∥v∥ = 1 be the elements satisfying
Condition 2. We prove that s satisﬁes Conditions 1 (a) and 1 (b).
If s = ω, since Q(ω) = Rℓ and bdQ(ω) = ∅, Conditions 1 (a) and 1 (b) trivially hold.
In the following, we suppose that s ̸= ω. Note that this implies that αi = ∥si−ωi∥ > 0
for at least one i ∈ I.
From the deﬁnitions of s and v, it is clear that
Q(s) = {p ∈ R
ℓ : p · v ≥ 0}.
Therefore, intQ(s) ̸= ∅. Note that from Florenzano and Le Van (2001) [Corollary 2.3.1,
p.31], we obtain
Q
0(s) = {βv ∈ R
ℓ : β ≤ 0}. (2)
Suppose now that for some p ∈ bdQ(s) \ {0}, there exists z ∈ Z(p) ∩ Q0(s) with
p · z = 0 and z ̸= 0. We prove that 0 ∈ Z(p).
From (2), there exists a negative real number β < 0 such that z = βv. Since p·z = 0,
we have p · v = 0, which implies
p · (si − ωi) = 0 for all i ∈ I.











i∈I(si − ωi). Then, z′ = γv, where γ =
∑






Then, λ ∈ (0,1), and
λz + (1 − λ)z
′ = λ(βv) + (1 − λ)(γv) = 0.
Moreover, since Z(p) is convex under Assumptions 1 (a) and 2 (c),
λz + (1 − λ)z
′ ∈ Z(p).
Thus, 0 ∈ Z(p).
Proof of Proposition 3. By Assumptions 1 (b), 2 (a) and 2 (b), S ̸= ∅. If there exists




i∈I ωi, then, (s,0) ∈ X × Rℓ is a competitive equilibrium. Thus,
we may suppose without loss of generality that any s ∈ S is not feasible.
For each i ∈ I, take an arbitrary si ∈ Si and let s = (si)i∈I ∈ S. In the following, we
prove that Conditions 1 (a) and 1 (b) hold for this s.
Let
ti = si − ωi.
By Assumption 1 (c) and Condition 3, we have ti ̸= 0 for all i ∈ I. Note also that
Q(s) = {p ∈ R
ℓ : p · ti ≥ 0 for all i ∈ I}.
Step 1: We ﬁrst prove that s satisﬁes Condition 1 (a). For this, it suﬃces to show that
0 / ∈ co{t1,··· ,tn}.
Indeed, if the convex hull of {t1,··· ,tn} does not contain the origin, then, from the strict
separation theorem, there exists a ℓ-dimensional vector p ∈ Rℓ \ {0} such that
p · z > 0 for all z ∈ co{t1,··· ,tn}.
9Especially,
p · ti > 0 for all i ∈ I,
and thus, p ∈ intQ(s).
Suppose now that 0 ∈ co{t1,··· ,tn}. Then, there exist n real numbers λ1,··· ,λn
such that ∑
i∈I
λi = 1, λi ∈ [0,1] for all i ∈ I
and ∑
i∈I
λiti = 0. (3)
Without loss of generality, we may assume
λ1 > 0 and λ1 ≥ λi for all i ̸= 1.































Since Xi is convex for all i ∈ I (by Assumption 1 (a)) and
λi
λ1










ωi ∈ Xi for all i ̸= 1.
If λi = λ1 for all i ∈ I, equation (4) implies that s ∈ S is feasible, which contradicts
our supposition that any element of S is not feasible. Therefore, λi < λ1 for some i ̸= 1.










Then, equation (4) implies
s1 ∈ intX1 ˆ X1,
which contradicts Condition 3.
Thus, we conclude that 0 / ∈ co{t1,··· ,tn}.
Step 2: We next prove that s satisﬁes Condition 1 (b). More precisely, we prove that
for all p ∈ bdQ(s) \ {0}, if z ∈ Z(p) ∩ Q0(s) and p · z = 0, then, z = 0.
Suppose that for some p ∈ bdQ(s) \ {0}, there exists z ∈ Z(p) ∩ Q(s)0 with p · z = 0
and z ̸= 0. In the following, we prove that for some i ∈ I, there exists a consumption
bundle xi ∈ Xi such that xi ∈ Si ∩ intXi ˆ Xi, which contradicts Condition 3.
10First, since z ∈ Q0(s), from Florenzano and Le Van (2001) [Corollary 2.3.1, p.31],





Since p · z = 0 and p · ti ≥ 0 for all i ∈ I, if µi < 0, then p · ti = 0.
Since z ̸= 0, there exists at least one j ∈ I such that
µj < 0 and |µj| ≥ |µi| for all i ̸= j.
Without loss of generality, we may assume that j = 1.
Since z ∈ Z(p), there exists x = (xi)i∈I ∈ X such that











(xi − ωi). (6)
Then, from (5) and (6),
∑
i∈I
(xi − ωi) +
∑
i∈I
|µi|(si − ωi) = 0. (7)






























Hence, from the convexity of Xi,
xi ∈ Xi for all i ∈ I.
Moreover, x = (xi)i∈I ∈ X is feasible. Indeed, from (8),
(1 + |µ1|)(xi − ωi) = (xi − ωi) + |µi|(si − ωi) for all i ∈ I. (9)




(xi − ωi) =
∑
i∈I
(xi − ωi) +
∑
i∈I
|µi|(si − ωi) = 0.
11Therefore, ∑
i∈I
(xi − ωi) = 0. (10)
We claim that for all i ∈ I with |µi| = |µ1|, we have xi ∈ Si (especially, x1 ∈ S1). Let
i ∈ I be the consumer with |µi| = |µ1|. Since |µi| = |µ1| > 0, we have p · ti = 0, which








We next claim that from the feasibility of x ∈ X, we have |µi| < |µ1| for some i ̸= 1.
Indeed, if |µi| = |µ1| for all i ∈ I, the previous claim implies that x ∈ S, which contradicts
the supposition that any element of S is not feasible.
Then, for i ̸= 1 with |µi| < |µ1|, from (8) and Assumptions 1 (a) and 1 (c), we have
xi ∈ intXi. In view of the feasibility of x ∈ X, this implies
x1 ∈ intX1 ˆ X1.
Since x1 ∈ S1, we obtain the desired contradiction.
12